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11. Introduction
Casual empiricism reveals that prices in the European airline industry have traditionally been
considerably higher than in other parts of the world, in particular in relationship to North-
America, for routes of roughly equivalent length. One popular explanation as to why that is the
case is that European airlines have substantial market power, either because of protected
market niches or because of outright cartel pricing practices. In particular, it is argued that the
bilateral agreements between member states is an important device to implement collusive
practices. Such an environment is commonly thought to have favored the exercise of market
power by individual carriers (see e.g. Seabright and McGowan, 1989). In fact, the rationale for
the "liberalization" program in the European airline industry is based on the presumption to end
monopolies and bring prices down to "more competitive" level.
However, when measuring market power in the European airline industry one finds little or no
evidence that firms price above non-cooperative levels. The standard conjectural variations
model yields pricing behavior that is consistent with Cournot type conduct (see for example
Good, Röller, and R. C. Sickles (1993b))1. It is worth emphasizing that the European studies
are based on aggregate data, i.e. they do not measure market power at the route level. To the
extent that there are significant differences in the competitive conduct at the route-level, and
that these heterogeneities are not linear, aggregate models may not accurately measure
market power.
It is interesting to compare these findings to the estimated market power in the U.S. airline
industry, where route-specific data are more readily available. Specifically in the U.S. airline
industry, market power has been studied by Brander and Zhang (1990)2. They conclude that
the Cournot model is much more consistent with the data in general than either Bertrand or
cartel behavior. Moreover, Brander and Zhang (1993) estimate a switching regime model for
the U.S. airline industry based on the theory of repeated games. They reject the constant
behavior models in favor of regime-switching models, where the punishment phases are best
described by Cournot competition. A related strand of literature suggests that market power is
                                                       
1 Slightly higher market power is found in Röller and Sickles (1999). However, a model of capacity
competition followed by price competition results in substantially lower levels of market power.
2 Other important contributions on pricing in the airline industry include Borenstein and Rose (1994) who
analyze price dispersion on a given flight. The effect of networks on competition and pricing are
studied in Brueckner, and Spiller (1991), and empirically tested in Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992).
Evans and Kessides (1994) investigate the ability to exercise market power in the airline industry
2quite significant in the U.S. airline industry. Hurdle et al. (1989) and Whinston and Collins
(1992) study the hypothesis of contestability of the U.S. airline industry. Overall they find that
the airline market is not contestable and that excess profits are being earned. In addition, Berry
(1990, 1992) and Borenstein (1989, 1990) argue that airlines are able to increase average
prices through strong airport presence and hub dominance.
Overall the available evidence from Europe and the U.S. is thus that market power in European
markets is not substantially higher relative to the U.S. market. In addition, the available
aggregate (non route-specific) evidence suggests that European carriers do not exercise any
collusive pricing practices – observed price costs margins are consistent with a non-cooperative
Nash behavior. Given these findings, it appears that one has to look elsewhere to explain the
relatively high prices in Europe.
There have been several explanations as to why that is the case, all of which are focused on
high costs. The first one relates to productive efficiency. Whenever firms are less efficient, low
margins in the product market could be associated with excessive costs that firms can afford
because of a lack of competitive pressure, rather than low prices. In this case, prices would be
high because costs are high, whereas price-cost margins would be small. Evidence regarding
productive efficiency is given in a number of studies (see for example Encaoua, (1991) and
Good, et.al. (1993a)). These comparisons between European carriers and U.S. carriers have
shown that the European carriers are less productive than U.S. carriers, with the relative
efficiency scores ranging from 50%-70%.
Excessive cost level can be associated either with productive inefficiencies (such that
European carriers use larger amounts of factors for given level of outputs relative to U.S.
carriers), or with excessive factor prices. Excessive factor prices is the topic of this paper.
Indeed, firms which enjoy substantial market power may have a tendency to pass on some of
the rent they earn to the factors they use. In particular, one can expect that the personnel
working for carriers with substantial market power will be in a favorable position to bargain for
wage increases. Some evidence in favor of this hypothesis has been provided by Seabright
and McGowan (1989), who compare the wages and labor productivity of European carriers to
those found among U.S. carriers. They find that European airlines pay a significant mark up
                                                       
through multimarket contact. They find that fares are higher on routes where the competing carriers
have inter-route contact.
3over U.S. rates for all categories of personnel whereas their labor productivity tend to be lower.
It is the second element of costs, i.e. rent-sharing, that this paper focuses on3.
More generally, in order to identify econometrically whether prices are high in Europe because
of high costs or collusive pricing practices one needs to develop a framework that endogenizes
costs and product market competition. The mechanism that is investigated in this paper is that
of rent sharing between management and unions4. To the extent that rent-sharing takes place
in the European airline industry, high prices might be consistent with low price-cost margins.
This, in turn, will seriously complicate the tasks of competition policy authorities. For example, if
one were to reduce marginal costs to those levels that would prevail under no rent-sharing,
then observed prices might in fact be close to monopoly prices. To put it differently, prices in
Europe might be close to monopoly prices, if one deflates costs by accounting for rent-sharing.
We will evaluate this claim in detail below.
The methodology proposed in this paper endogenizes costs by explicitly taking into account the
link between product market competition and costs: market power and its pass-through on
costs are simultaneously estimated. More specifically, we propose a methodology to measure
empirically the link between competition and rent sharing, focusing on one potential channel,
namely the settlement of excessive wages. We formalize airlines decisions as a two stage
game, in which wage settlement occurs in the first stage and is modeled as a bargaining game
between management and a representative union. At the second stage, the airlines decide on
prices in the market game. We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. We
implement the model empirically using data on European airlines for the period 1976-1994.
Besides the papers cited above there are two recent empirical contributions that are very much
related to our work. The work by Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) analyze relative earnings in
the U.S. airline industry using data from 1973-1997. They find that Labor rents are "attributable
largely to union bargaining power, which in turn is constrained by the financial health of
carriers."  In  contrast  to  their  approach, our approach  explicitly  models the interdependence
                                                       
3 Yet another explanation for higher costs might be that the technology used is different in the U.S. than
in Europe. Productivity is usually decomposed into technical efficiency and technological progress.
Nevertheless, to the extent that technological progress is not picked up by the efficiency scores, there
remains little empirical evidence that technological progress has been larger in the U.S. relative to
Europe (Good et al. 1993a).
4 There are other approaches to establish a link between competition and efficiency. As shown by Hart
(1983), a competition in the product markets can indeed tighten the incentives constraints faced by
managers and reduce the scope for managerial slack.
4between product market competition, union power, and wages arriving at three simultaneous
equations. Ng and Seabright (1999) estimate the effect of competition on productive efficiency.
They estimate that "the European airline industry is currently operating at cost levels some 25%
higher than they would be if the industry had the same ownership and competitive structure as
the U.S. industry." Unlike our approach, Ng and Seabright use a cost function approach with a
second equation that explains the rent to labor.
Compared to some of the other contributions in the literature, our approach is more "structural",
in the sense of imposing more functional forms as well as a specific equilibrium concept. An
advantage of this approach is that the interdependence between product market competition,
union power, and wages are explicitly accounted for. However, structural empirical work is also
subject to several criticisms (see also Genesove and Mullin 1998). For once, the results may be
rather sensitive to the functional form assumptions or the precise specifications of demand and
cost conditions. Another problem lies with the static framework which will introduce a bias in
estimating the conduct parameter, especially when conduct is correlated with demand and cost
variables (see Corts 1999). A third problem might occur when "average conduct" estimates are
assumed, even though the industry is asymmetric, which introduces an aggregation bias (see
Neven and Röller, 1999).
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model of rent
sharing. Section 3 develops the empirical implementation, discusses the results, and interprets
the findings. Section 4 concludes.
2. A Model of Rent Sharing and Market Competition
In this section we specify a two-stage game in which a representative union bargains with
management over the wage rate in the first stage, with a price-setting product differentiated
market game to follow in stage two. We assume that neither unions nor management
coordinate their bargaining behavior in stage one. However, both parties will take the product
market game into account when bargaining takes place in stage one. In other words, the more
profitable (rent) the product market game in stage two, the higher the equilibrium wage which
unions are able to extract from management (holding bargaining power constant). Higher
wages, in turn, will lower the rent in stage two which will reduce the ability by unions obtain
5higher wages. In equilibrium these two effects will offset each other. In this sense the product
market outcome and the resulting cost function are simultaneously determined.
We begin by modeling demand in the European airline industry in the following fashion,
q p p Zi i j i( , , ),  i N 1,.., (1)
where N is the number of carriers (or countries), iq  is the quantity demanded, ip  is a price
index for carrier i, and jp  is a price index of the competitors prices. iZ  is a vector of country-
specific, exogenous factors affecting demand. The implicit duopoly assumption in (1) can be
justified by the existence of bilateral agreements. While the European carriers were engaged in
moderate competition in Transatlantic travel, the domestic scheduled market remained heavily
regulated through bilateral agreements until the mid-eighties. The resulting duopolistic market
structures created by the bilateral agreements also prevented new entry in the intra-European
market. Moreover, we maintain the usual assumption on price elasticity of demand:
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0 . That is, the own-price effect is larger in absolute value than the cross-price
effect.
We specify the firm-level cost function as follows,
C q Ri i i( , , )Z (2)
That is, total costs depend on quantity ( iq ), the wage rate (Zi ), and a vector of exogenous
cost characteristics iR .
The structure of the game which firms and unions are engaged in is a two-stage set-up. At
stage 2, firms compete in the product market by choosing prices to maximize profits, i.e. firms
solve the following problem,
max (.) ( (.)| , )
pi
i i i i i iq p C q RS Z  i N 1,..,
where )(iq  is given in (1). Note that the wage rate is assumed to be exogenous at this stage.
The corresponding first-order conditions, which endogenize pricing, are given by
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behavior parameter T  can be interpreted as the degree of coordination in a price-setting game.
In particular, when 0 T , firms behavior is consistent with that under a Bertrand-Nash pricing
game. In this case (3) reduces to the well-known case in which firms price according to their
own elasticities. When 0T , firms behave more competitive than Bertrand-Nash. On the other
hand, when 0!T , firms behave more collusively than Bertrand-Nash. In particular, cartel
pricing is associated with a 1 T . Finally, as foT , price approaches marginal costs and the
market outcome can be categorized as perfectly competitive.
At stage 1, firms bargain with their respective unions over wages. We assume that the solution
is characterized by an asymmetric Nash bargaining outcome given by the following program:
 ^ `max ( )
Z
G GZ S
i
i i iL
1
, where G  is the degree of union bargaining power and ( G1 ) is the firms’
bargaining power. Whenever G  is unity, unions have all the bargaining power. Conversely as
G  close to zero, management has the maximum bargaining power. The above Nash solution
thus assumes that management attempts to maximize iS , whereas unions like to obtain high
wages.
There are a number of qualifications with the above set-up that are important to mention at this
point. First, we assume that unions take employment as given and bargain only over wages.
One reason for doing this is to keep the model tractable. However, we believe that during the
sample period under investigation this is not unrealistic. Only with the recent pressures from
deregulation have unions and management begun to explicitly reduce their wage demands in
exchange for employment security. In addition, we do not consider other type of work rule
negotiations and benefits (such as working hours, vacations, social benefits, etc.). Even though
these other benefits are on the negotiation table, it is not unreasonable to assume that in
Europe the main object over which bargaining takes place are wage demands. To the extent
7that other factors are not correlated with wages (and enter the objective functions of
management or the unions differently) our results need to be qualified.
Second, we model the situation as a single union bargaining with management. As similarly
skilled workers segregate into many smaller unions (pilots, mechanics, flight attendants), one
could think of a more complicated bargaining set-up. Modeling several unions bargaining
independently over several factors – possibly simultaneously – with management is well
beyond the scope of this paper. Essentially, our set-up assumes that labor interests are
represented by a representative union (or by a collusive set of unions) and that the primary
factor of conflict are wages.
The final caveat is that we need to account for the subsidies which airlines receive from their
respective governments. These subsidies, or more precisely the potential subsidies, should be
included in the "cake" which management and unions bargain over. In order to control for the
subsidy effect, we assume that airlines are subsidized to the extent that they are always bailed
out by their governments: governments are prepared to ensure that their airlines do not exist.
Given these considerations, we implement the presence of government by imposing a non-
negative profit constraint on iS .
The corresponding first-order conditions are given by,
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Let us denote the equilibrium prices defined by (3) as ),( jiip ZZ . Substituting them into the
profit function iS  and differentiating w.r.t. iZ , yields
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8which upon substitution allows us to rewrite the first-order condition (4) as,
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Given the two-stage set-up, the effect of the stage 1 variable (wages) on stage two variables
(prices) is given by  / iip wZw  and  / ijp wZw , which we call the sequential strategic effect. In a
simultaneous Nash game, wages and prices are chosen simultaneously, which implies that
 / iip wZw  and  / ijp wZw  must be zero. Accordingly, we are able to perform a specification test
for the appropriateness of the sequential set-up by testing whether the sequential strategic
effects are statistically different from zero. This will be done below.
Rather than specifying specific functional forms, we use the structure of the model to solve
explicitly for sequential strategic effects. Implicit differentiation of (3) w.r.t. iZ  and jZ  yields,
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own and cross partial demand derivatives including the conjectural variations, respectively.
Note that the conditions for the existence and stability of stage 2 equilibrium, 0A  and
022 ! BAH p , together with the condition of strategic complementarity, 0!B , imply that
the own-sequential effect has the same sign but is greater than the cross-sequential effect.
That is, w
wZ
w
wZ
p pi
i
j
i
! .5 Also note that w
wZ
MC
i
! 0  is the effect of wages on marginal costs in stage
two. This is an important parameter of the model, since whenever it is zero there is no strategic
link between the two periods. The significance of this parameter will be a testable hypothesis in
the empirical section below.
Before estimating the above model, we need to determine wages if there were no unions. By
comparing wages obtained by unions to the wages determined by marginal productivity of
                                                       
5 The strategic complementarity condition 0!B , and the second-order condition and its Hessian 0A
and 022 ! BAH p  will be empirically tested below.
9labor, we are able to assess the extent to which rent sharing occurs. A competitive labor market
would set wages as follows,
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w
 is firm i’s marginal product of labor and iiK  and ijK  are the own and cross price
elasticity of demand, respectively. By comparing the equilibrium wage and prices given by
equations (3) and (5) to those given by equations (3) and (7), we can asses the extent of rent
sharing.
3. Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Specification, Data and Estimation
The empirical implementation of the model in the above section involves simultaneously
estimating the demand equation (1), the two first-order condition (3) and (5) subject to (6). The
endogenous variables are therefore prices, quantities, and wages. The demand equation
corresponding to (1) is specified as follows,
q p p GASOLINE GDP GCONS RAIL NETWORKi i j i i i i i i        D D D D D D D D H0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 (8)
where i1H  denotes the error term. The exogenous variables influencing demand are: an index
of the price of all other airlines (Pj), an index of the price of gasoline (GASOLINE), a measure
of country size (GDP), a measure of economic activity – consumption growth (GCONS), an
index for the price of rail transportation (RAIL), and a measure of the size of the carriers'
network (NETWORK). The data and their construction are described in more detail in Appendix
A. Summary statistics of the data are given in Table 1.
Specification (8) assumes that jp  is exogenous. Essentially there are three alternatives if one
were to use firm-level data. The first alternative is to assume symmetry. This is clearly a strong
assumption and empirically simply false [footnote: In fact, under symmetry (or alternatively
under some more restrictive assumptions on the cost function, see Neven and Röller, 1999)
one could aggregate the first-order condition over all firms such that only aggregate data are
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necessary for estimation]. The second alternative, is to estimate another equation which
endogenizes jp . Given the already extensive structure in the current paper (we already
estimate three equations) this is likely to be asking too much from the data. Finally, there is the
alternative which we have chosen in (8), namely to assume that jp  is exogenous, which may
lead to simultaneity bias. Besides imposing more structure (i.e. add another equation), the main
trade-off is between potential bias stemming from imposing symmetry and the simultaneity of
jp . Since we know that imposing symmetry is simply incorrect, we have taken the other
approach in this paper.
Regarding the cost function, we must specify the derivatives of (2). The marginal cost equation
( iqC ww / ) defined implicitly in (2) is assumed to be linear in wage, the price indexes for capital
and materials, as well as a variety of cost and quality characteristics such as the load factor
(LOADF), the stage length (STAGEL), the percentage of wide-bodied planes in the fleet
(PWIDEB), and the percentage of turboprop planes (PTURBO). That is,
 iiiiiii
i
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Using the above functional specifications, we can simplify (3) into,
i
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where i2H  is the error term and MC is given by (9).
For the first-order condition for wage bargaining in stage one (5), note that under the above
functional specifications, 212 TDD  A  and 2D B . Moreover, we can make use of
Shephard's lemma such that w
wZ
C L
i
i . Substituting into (5), making use of (6), we arrive at our
empirical specification for the management-union bargaining process,
 p MC Li i
i
i
i

 
 

  
2
2 1 0
1 2 1 2 1
1 2
2
2
2 3
D D D TD E
D TD D
G
G
S
Z
H
( )
( ) (11)
where MC is given by (9). It should be stated that the above specification assumes that both
the conduct parameter as well as the degree of union power parameter are time and firm
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invariant. However, given the rather small number of observations and the considerable
amount of structure already imposed, we are unable to get significant results out of further firm-
specific effects. Therefore, our results are to be interpreted as averages (over firms and over
time) as far as the conduct and the bargaining power parameter are concerned.
Using non-linear three stages, we estimate above system of three equations (8), (10), and (11),
where the endogenous variables are given by wages, prices and output. The results are
reported in Table 2.
3.2 Consistency Checks
Before interpreting the results, we perform several consistency checks on whether the
theoretical model is in line with the empirical estimates. These tests can be thought of as
specification tests of having chosen the "right" structure for the data in hand. Given that we
have imposed a considerable amount of structure, there are a number of conditions which
need to be satisfied but have not been imposed ex ante. The purpose of this subsection is to
investigate whether the "data reject the model".
As can be seen in Table 2, the demand estimates are in line with our maintained assumptions.
Both the own-price elasticity (-0.887 ) and cross-price elasticity (0.331) have the expected signs
at sample mean. In addition, our maintained assumption that the own-price effect is larger in
absolute value than the cross-price effect, is confirmed by the data at each sample point6.
Also the estimates in Table 2 imply at all sample points that the partial own-demand effect is
negative ( 0'i ) while the cross-demand effect is positive 0!' j , and the partial own
demand effect (at all sample points) is larger in absolute value than the cross-demand effect,
i.e. 0!'!' ji . Moreover, the second order condition in stage 1 is satisfied, i.e.
w Z S
wZ
G G2 1
2 0
(( ) )i i i
i
L 
  (See Appendix 2), which guarantees the existence of stage 1 equilibrium.
The second order conditions (for both existence and stability) in stage 2 are also satisfied, i.e.
0A  and 022 ! BAH p  (See Appendix 2). In addition, the strategic complementarity
condition is satisfied, i.e. 0!B . Finally the effect of wage on marginal costs, iMC Zww / , is
                                                       
6 For example at the sample mean, we have .84.673322/40.1820962/  ww! ww jiii pqpq
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positive. As mentioned in the previous section, this implies that the own-sequential effect
( iip wZw / ) is greater than the cross-sequential strategic effect ( ijp wZw / ) in absolute value and
that they have the same sign.
In sum, the estimates in Table 2 are consistent with all the restrictions and maintained
assumptions of theoretical model developed above.
3.3 Interpretation of Parameters
We now interpret the results given in Table 2 in more detail. The price elasticity of demand is
estimated at -0.887, which indicates an elasticity close to unity (in fact the estimate is
statistically not significantly different from one). The cross-price elasticity is estimated at 0.331,
which indicates that the services provided by airlines are substitutes.
Many of the remaining parameters have the expected signs. For the demand equation, GDP,
consumption growth, and the size of the network all have positive and significant effects. The
price of railroad transportation also has a positive impact on airline demand, which suggests
that air travel and rail travel are significant substitutes. By contrast, the price of gasoline has a
negative and significant effect on airline demand, indicating that automobiles and air travel are
complements. This might be explained by the fact that gasoline prices are highly correlated
with fuel prices. The cost parameters have the expected signs as well. The price of capital and
the price of materials are positively related to marginal costs. In addition, both the load factor
and the length of stage lower marginal costs. An increase in wide-bodied planes lowers
marginal costs, and more turboprop planes raise marginal costs.
Finally, the price of labor (wages) increases marginal costs. Hence, rent sharing raises airline’s
marginal costs by raising wages. As mentioned earlier, the effect of wage on marginal costs,
iMC wZw / , determines whether the two-stage model can be reduced to a one-stage model.
Since this effect is positive and significant (t-stat of 4.93), we reject a one-stage model in favor
of the two-stage specification.
Note that the estimated conduct parameter T  is -.047 (t-stat of -0.35) in this two-stage set-up.
This implies that T  is insignificantly different from zero, that is, we cannot reject Bertrand-Nash
behavior in the product market. Furthermore, as is shown in Appendix C, the T  that would
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correspond to Cournot-Nash conjectures for the above model can be shown to be 12 DDT  ,
which is equal to
 0.37. As can readily be calculated, we reject Cournot-Nash behavior with a
t-stat of -3.15 (see Table 2). Moreover, we reject cartel pricing behavior with a t-stat of -7.90.
Regarding competition in the product market, we can therefore conclude that the data is
consistent with a rather non-collusive environment. In fact, we find conduct to be consistent
with Bertrand pricing, which is even more competitive than previous estimates for European
airlines.
Turning to the measurement of union power, it appears that there is strong evidence
suggesting that unions do have significant bargaining power with a G  of 0.813 (t-stat of 33.88).
However, as we mention above, we need to compare this to the G  which corresponds to the
competitive labor market solution which is given by (7) and can be written as,7
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To obtain a G  corresponding to the competitive labor market, we jointly calibrate equations (8),
(10) and (12) for the three endogenous variables prices, wages, and quantities. This is done by
setting all exogenous variables to their sample means and using the estimates in Table 28. The
obtained values of the endogenous variables can be interpreted as the 'anti-monde', i.e. what
would happen if no union power was present, holding the structure of the estimated model
constant. We then use the 'anti-monde' values of the endogenous variables, substitute them
into (11), and solve for G . This procedure yields a G  of 0.712 which corresponds to the
competitive labor market solution. Comparing this value of G  to the estimated value of G  in
Table 2 reveals that the estimated union power is significantly higher than the competitive labor
market solution (a t-stat of 4.21). This implies that wages are higher and that rent sharing is
significant. In other words, unions do have an impact.
                                                       
7 As can be seen in Appendix C, 
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8 Since we do not estimate a production function, we are unable to get an estimate of the marginal
product of labor (
i
i
L
q
w
w ) directly. We therefore use the estimate obtained by Good, Nadiri, Röller and
Sickles 1993. They estimate a Cobb-Douglass production function where 
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 is firm i’s
marginal product of labor.
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3.4 Calibrations, Scenario Comparisons, and Welfare Implications
In order to assess and quantify the effect of product market competition and union power on
the market outcome we have summarized various scenarios in Table 3 in terms of the level of
wages, prices and product market mark-ups. The entries in Table 3 are computed by using the
estimates in Table 2, setting all exogenous variables at their sample means, and solving the
three equations ((8), (10), and (11)) for the three endogenous variables (wages, prices and
quantities). This procedure is then done for various values of product-market imperfections (T )
and labor market imperfections (G ) yielding the corresponding numbers in Table 3.
Focusing on the actual estimated product market conduct (column one of Table 3,
corresponding to a T  of -0.047 ) we compare the actual market scenario (top-left) to that which
would happen when unions have no power (bottom left, corresponding to a G  of 0.712). As
can be seen the effect of union power on wages is quite significant, raising wages from 16.52
to 25.559. However, the impact on price-cost margins as well as prices is relatively small, with
prices being increased from 1.72 to 1.77 due to unions. This implies that the path-through
effect of unions is mainly through fixed costs and less through marginal costs and prices.
Moreover, this finding is robust across the varies product market scenarios in Table 3 (compare
across columns). The impact of unions is consistently the same: mainly through wages, but
less on prices and mark-ups. As expected, Cournot competition would imply significantly higher
prices and mark-ups (see the second column in Table 3). However, as mentioned above, the
estimated conduct in the product market is not consistent with Cournot, but with Bertrand.
We are now in a position to evaluate the claim "prices in Europe might be close to monopoly
prices, if one deflates costs by accounting for rent-sharing". To investigate this statement, we
perform the following calibration of equations (10) and (11). We hold prices at the level
predicted by our model (i.e. 1.77), but reduce wages to their marginal product (i.e. 16.52).
Using the estimates in Table 2 once again, we solve for the implied conduct parameter in the
product market (T ). In other words, we solve for the level of product market competition,
assuming that costs are deflated to the level of competitive wage setting. The result is a T  of
0.170, which is still significantly less than Cournot behavior, and consequently statistically
                                                       
9 It should be stated that the impact on wages due to union power might be understated here because
we do not allow for labor to adjust when we calibrate the "without union power" scenario in Table 3. It
is reasonable that employment might increase due to wage reductions and that the marginal
productivity of labor would decrease as a consequence. This implies that the wage reduction due to
the loss of union power would be magnified by an decrease in marginal product of labor, leading to a
lower wage than 16.52.
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inconsistent with monopoly behavior. We therefore find no evidence to support the above
claim, namely it is incorrect to the suggest that airline prices in Europe are close to monopoly
prices, if one accounts for rent-sharing.
Even though the impact on mark-ups appears to be rather small, it would be incorrect to
suggest that rent-sharing is insignificant. The amount of rent being transferred to labor can
readily be calculated from Table 3 as the change in wages multiplied by the amount of labor,
i.e. ii L*Z' . This amounts to some $242 million per carrier per year, which is fairly sizable. In
comparison with the average loss of the European carriers in our sample period over 1976-
1994, which is approximately $157 million per carrier per year, this implies that the rent being
shared more than offsets the average loss. Moreover, even though the mark-ups are only
affected by a small percentage, the loss in consumer surplus is non-negligible. Using our
estimated linear demand function the loss in consumer surplus can be calculated in the usual
way to be some $130 million per carrier per year, out of which roughly $3 million are
deadweight loss. This implies that some $127 million per carrier per year are transferred from
consumers to labor, which is about 52% of the total rent being shifted.
In sum, the above findings imply that the impact of unions is far from being insignificant. Even
though the impact of unions on prices is relatively small, there is substantial amount of loss in
consumer surplus. The deadweight loss, however, is only $3 million per carrier per year, which
implies that the effect of unions is mostly in terms of shifting rents from consumers (and
presumably owners and tax payers) to labor. According to our estimates, the inefficiency of
unions is only 1.2 cents for every dollar of rent shifting10. In this sense, the static impact of
unions is largely on equity and less on efficiency: the winners are the unions and the losers the
consumer, while economic efficiency is relatively unaffected.
                                                       
10 This is obtained by comparing the $242 million of rent shifted to the $3 million deadweight loss.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition
and union power. Our findings can be summarized as follows:
x
 product market competition is high and statistically consistent with Betrand behavior.
x
 observed prices in Europe are not consistent with cartel pricing, once costs are deflated by
hypothetically eliminating rent-sharing.
x
 price and price-cost margins are less affected by rent-sharing as the impact of unions is
mainly through fixed costs and less through marginal costs
x
 nevertheless, rent-sharing in European airlines is significant and its magnitude is sizable
($242 million per carrier per year)
x
 the transfer from consumers to labor is significant, about 52% of the total rent being shifted
is shifted from the consumer
x
 the static impact of unions is largely on equity and less on efficiency.
Even though the static impact of unions on efficiency less dramatic, one should not
underestimate the dynamic impact of unions. Rent-sharing of this magnitude might influence
the ability of firms to stay in business, thereby inducing excessive exit. In this context, rent-
sharing might prevent the evolution of an efficient market structure. Moreover, entry barriers
(for instance slot allocations to incumbents) which might be partially created by governments,
prevent efficient entry. Finally, there are other welfare considerations. Given that there have
been significant subsidies by the respective governments (both explicit and implicit), part of the
transfers have been from tax payers to labor. Therefore, the cost of raising public funds has to
be taken into account.
Besides the market structure explanation just mentioned, the question of why prices in Europe
have been so much higher still remains. Given that there is little evidence of collusion, and
given that the rent sharing arrangements in European airlines do not provide much explanatory
power either, it appear that the most reasonable explanation is the relative lack of productive
efficiency. Understanding the precise mechanism by which competition increases productive
efficiency, and quantifying it empirically, seem to be an important area for further research.
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Appendix A: Data Description, Sources and Construction
This study uses a panel of the eight largest European carriers – Air France, Alitalia, British
Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, SABENA and SAS with annual data from 1976 through 1994.
There are therefore in principle 152 observations. Since some variables for SABENA and KLM
are missing for the years 1991-1994, as well as for Air France, LH, and Alitalia for 1994, we are
left with a total of 141 observations.
In general, the data can be organized into three broad categories: factor prices, output, output
prices, airline characteristics, and demand data.
Factor Prices
The primary source for the production data is the Digest of Statistics from the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Good, Röller, and Sickles [1993] constructed a set of three
airline input prices: (i) Labor, (ii) Materials and (iii) Capital.
(i) Labor (variable Z ): The labor input is an aggregate of five separate categories of
employment used in the production of air travel. Included in these categories are all cockpit
crew, mechanics, ticketing, passenger handlers and other employees. Information on annual
expenditures and the number of employees in each of the above categories were obtained
from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Fleet and Personnel Series. These
indices are aggregates of a number of sub components using a Divisia multilateral index
number procedure [Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982].
(ii) Materials (variable PM): Expenditures on supplies, services, ground-based capital
equipment, and landing fees are combined into a single input aggregate called materials. It is
not necessarily true that the purchasing power of a dollar or its market exchange rate
equivalent is the same in all countries. Consequently we use the purchasing power parity
exchange rates constructed from Heston and Summers [1988]. These are adjusted by allowing
for changes in market exchange rates and changes in price levels. Use of airport runways is
constructed by using landing fee expenses and using aircraft departures as the quantity
deflator. The service price for owned ground based equipment is constructed by using the
original purchase price, 7% depreciation and the carrier's interest rate on long term debt. Fuel
expenses are given for each carrier in ICAO's Financial Data Series. Unfortunately, there are
18
no quantity or price figures given in that source. There are two possible solutions. The first is to
estimate fuel consumption for each aircraft type in the fleet, given the consumption of U.S.
carriers on similar equipment for the specific number of miles flown and adjusting for stage
length. Alternatively, fuel prices for international traffic in several different regions is available
through ICAO's Regional Differences in Fares and Costs. The airline's fuel price is then
estimated as a weighted average of the domestic fuel price (weighted by domestic available
ton-kilometers), and regional prices (weighted by international available ton-miles in the
relevant region). This method explicitly recognizes that for international carriers not all fuel is
purchased in the airline's home country. As with the labor input, these sub components are
aggregated using a multilateral index number procedure and are termed materials.
(iii) Capital (variable PK): A very detailed description is available for aircraft fleets. These data
include the total number of aircraft, aircraft size, aircraft age, aircraft speed, and utilization
rates. This information is available over the course of a year from ICAO and a calendar year's
end inventory is available from IATA's World Air Transport Statistics. Asset values for each of
these aircraft types in half-time condition is obtained from Avmark, one of the world's leading
aircraft appraisers. This data source provides a more reasonable measure of the value of the
fleet since it varies with changing market conditions. Jorgenson-Hall user prices for the fleet are
constructed by using straight line depreciation with a total asset life of 20 years and the
relevant long term interest rates.
Output
Output (variable iq ) is obtained from ICAO's Commercial Airline Traffic Series. ICAO
disaggregate airline output along physical dimensions (classification into passenger output and
cargo), along utilization dimensions, along functional dimensions (classification into scheduled
and non-scheduled output), and finally on geographic dimensions (classification into domestic
and international output). We utilize the classification based on physical dimensions and on
services provided. Total airline output is gotten by aggregating quantities of passenger and
cargo tonne kilometers of service, and incidental services where weights are based on revenue
shares in total output.
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Output Prices
The output price (variable ip ) is calculated as a ratio of the carrier's passenger revenues to
passenger ton-kilometer miles performed. The revenues for the carriers are obtained from the –
Digest of Statistics (Financial Data – Commercial Air Carriers) from the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The price of the "other" airlines (variable jp ) in the duopoly
model is computed by weighting all the individual prices by their respective revenue shares in
the market.
Airline Characteristics
Three characteristics of airline output and two characteristics of the capital stock are calculated.
These included load factor (LOADF), stage length (STAGEL), the percent of the fleet which is
wide bodied (PWIDE), and the percent of the fleet which uses turboprop propulsion (PTURBO).
The primary source for the network data is the World Air Transport Statistics publication of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA). Load factor provides a measure of service
quality and is used as a proxy for service competition. Stage length provides a measure of the
length of individual route segments in the carrier's network. Both the percent of the fleet which
is wide bodied and the percent using turboprop propulsion provide measures of the potential
productivity of capital. The percent wide bodied provides a measure of average equipment
size. As more wide bodied aircraft are used, resources for flight crews, passenger and aircraft
handlers, landing slots, etc. do not increase proportionately. The percent turboprops provide a
measure of aircraft speed. This type of aircraft flies at approximately one-third of the speed of
jet equipment. Consequently, providing service in these types of equipment requires
proportionately more flight crew resources than with jets.
Demand Data
Demand data was collected for the respective countries – France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain,
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway. The different data series for Denmark, Sweden and Norway are weighted by their
respective GDP's in order to create single representative indices for the Scandinavian
countries, which share the majority of the equity in SAS.
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A measure of network size (NETWORK) is constructed by the total number of route kilometers
an airline operates on. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was obtained from the Main Economic
Indicators publication of the Economics and Statistics Department of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is reported for the above countries, in
billions of dollars. The growth in private consumption (GCONS) is defined as an implicit price
index with year to year percentage changes as reported by the OECD Economic Outlook
publication, Historical Statistics. Jane's World Railway is the source of the rail data. Rail traffic
is reported in four categories: passenger journeys, passenger tone-kilometers, freight net tone-
kilometers and freight tones. The three revenue categories are passengers and baggage,
freight, parcels and mail, and other income. To be consistent with the price of air travel, the rail
price (RAIL) was calculated as the ratio of passenger revenue to passenger tone-kilometers.
We thank S. Perelman for making available to us some of the more recent rail data which were
not available in Jane's World Railway. Finally, the retail gasoline price (GASOLINE) were
obtained from the OECD, International Energy Agency's publication, Energy Prices and Taxes.
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Appendix B
Second-Order Conditions and Strategic Complementarity Condition
In this appendix we derive the second order conditions in stage 1 and 2 and also the strategic
complementarity condition. We start with stage 2 by rewriting its first order condition (3) as,
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Appendix C
The Relationship between the Conjectures in a Pricing and Quantity Game
In this appendix, we derive the relationship between a pricing game and a quantity game for
differentiated products. Denote firm i’s profit function as )((.) iiii qcpq  S , where iq  is
carrier i’s quantity, ip  is a price index for carrier i, and jp  is a price index of the competitors
prices, and ),((.) jiii ppqq   denotes the demand function for firm i.
Pricing Game
The first order condition in a pricing game is
j
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where ij dpdp T  is firm i’s conjectural variation in the pricing game. In particular, when
0 T , firm’s behavior is consistent with Bertrand-Nash.
Quantity Game
From the demand function ),((.) jiii ppqq  , we can derive the inverse demand function,
),((.) jiii qqpp  . Rewriting the profit function in terms of iq , we have )((.) iiii qcqp  S .
The corresponding first order condition in a quantity game is then given by
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where ijq dqdq T  is firm i’s conjectural variation in the quantity game. In particular, when
0 qT , firm’s behavior is consistent with Cournot-Nash.
The relationship between T  and qT
The pricing game and the quantity game are equivalent when the first order are the same. That
is,
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Which reduces the equivalence expression (E1) to
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Therefore, the T  that corresponds to a Cournot-Nash quantity game  0 qT  is 12 DDT  .
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Number of
Observations
Mean Minimum Maximum
Pi 141 1.123 0.626 2.021
Qi 141 2304691.910 69085.130 8839172.470
Zi 141 31.913 3.677 70.863
Pj 141 1.119 0.745 1.647
PK 141 1900.780 533.980 5800.890
PM 141 138.883 79.740 225.663
Li 141 26809.890 6277.000 54919.000
Ki 141 98.594 23.500 233.000
Mi 141 12924.570 2148.400 53386.780
GASOLINE 141 0.691 0.311 1.270
GDP 141 679.375 147.900 1737.400
GCONS 141 7.313 -0.900 23.700
RAIL 141 0.052 0.014 0.136
NETWORK 141 445878.140 188787.000 1072390.000
LOADF 141 0.639 0.535 0.727
STAGEL 141 1.202 0.689 3.660
PWIDEB 141 0.234 0.080 0.529
PTURBO 141 0.029 0.000 0.195
For variable definitions see Appendix A.
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Table 2. European Airlines – Two-Stage Game
 (Non-Linear Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates)
Variable Estimates t-statistics
Demand Equation
INTERCEPT -1.091 -5.61
Pi -0.887 -4.25
Pj 0.331 9.99
GASOLINE -0.852 -5.57
GDP 0.338 5.73
GCONS 0.088 2.04
RAIL 0.677 9.21
NETWORK 0.315 3.53
Marginal Cost (wc / wqi)
INTERCEPT 1.190 2.19
Zi 0.012 4.93
PK 0.000 3.51
PM 0.005 4.98
LOADF -0.978 -1.17
STAGEL -0.463 -3.81
PWIDEB -1.205 -2.40
PTURBO 0.307 0.62
Union Power Parameter
G 0.813 33.88
Bertrand Cournot
(T = 0) (T = 0.370)
Behavioral Parameter
T -0.047 -0.35 -3.15
The estimates reported in the demand equation are converted into elasticities
evaluated at their sample means. For number of observations, see Table 1.
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Table 3. Union Power, Market Power and Price-Cost Margins under
Alternative Specifications
Product Market
Estimated Conduct
T  0 047.
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